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SESSION TWO
DEVELOPMENTS: PAST AND FUTURE IN THE NMB'S
DETERMINATION OF "CRAFT OR CLASS"
By

GLEN HARLANt

W

HEN I think of the Railway Labor Act' in philosophical termswhich is not often-I am reminded of the old definition of a
camel: A horse designed by a committee. As you know, the Railway Labor
Act was drafted by a committee-a joint management-union committee
at that. With labor-management negotiations as its source, and with an
indulgent and relatively .uncritical Congress which was delighted to act
on legislation miraculously supported by the two normally hostile factions,
it is not surprising that the Act, like the camel, developed some "humps"
which the courts, litigants and negotiators have been attempting to surmount for many years.
Perhaps the most puzzling "hump" produced by this committee is section 2, Ninth. This provision is the heart and soul of the collective bargaining system created by the Act, yet no one can be sure what it means.
Section 2 clearly specifies that collective bargaining shall take place between
the representative of a carrier and the representative of a "craft or class" of
employees. Yet, there is no definition of "craft or class"; no standards are
prescribed by which anyone can determine what constitutes a craft or class,
and indeed, there is no clear authority for anyone to make that determination.
Other terms are specifically defined-"carrier," "commerce," "em-

ployee, .... representative" and even "district court"--but there is no clue
as to the meaning of that critical bargaining unit, the craft or class. This
deficiency clearly is not inadvertent. The draftsmen of the Act must have

given the matter careful thought, for they specifically provided in section
1, Fifth that "no occupational classification made by order of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) shall be construed to define the crafts

according to which railway employees may be organized by their voluntary
action, nor shall the jurisdiction or powers of such employee organizations
be regarded as in any way limited or defined by the provisions of this

Act or by the orders of the Commission." Thus, we know that the ICC
has no authority to define the term and that any ICC listing of "crafts"

is wholly irrelevant. Why did the draftsmen not then proceed to state
t A.B., Simpson College; J.D., State University of Iowa. Vice-President-Legal Affairs, Eastern
Air Lines, Inc.
IRailway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 54 Stat. 785-86, 45 U.S.C. S 151
(1964).
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who should define the term and what standards should be used? That
question was asked of Commissioner Eastman, the principal sponsor of
the 1934 amendments to the Act, who stated:
We thought of that, as to whether or not it was necessary to define craft or
class, but those are words which have been used in labor parlance for a very
long time, and I think there would be no difficulty in determining what is a
craft or class of employees.'
Commissioner Eastman went on to state that any disputes of this nature
would be resolved by the National Mediation Board under section 2, Ninth.
With all due respect to a most distinguished and capable ICC Commissioner and Federal Coordinator of Transportation, that is not a very satisfactory answer, even as related to the railroad industry. And when one
considers that Congress, less than two years later, applied exactly the same
provisions to the airlines' without further definition of the term "craft or
class," it is apparent that Commissioner Eastman's explanation will not
suffice. At that point in history the airlines certainly had no established
crafts or classes with the possible exception of pilots and, as applied to the
airlines, the absence of a definition or statutory standards could mean only
one thing, that the agency charged with settling any representation dispute had complete discretion in determining what constituted a "craft or
class." Shades of Schechter' and Panama Refining!'
Between the 1934 amendments to the Railway Labor Act and the 1936
addition of the airlines to its purview, Congress, in 1935, passed the National Labor Relations Act' which spelled out in some detail the factors
to be considered in defining the collective bargaining unit subject to that
statute. Congress knew how to define such terms; the committee which
created the Railway Labor Act knew how to define other terms, and knew
how to specify what would not govern or influence the definition of "craft
or class." Thus, I am forced to the conclusion that the committee simply
did not wish to define this term, probably because no agreement concerning a definition could be reached, and the whole project to create an
agreed statute might have fallen apart if the drive for a definition had
been pressed. Negotiations between labor and management often result in
ambiguities since neither party wishes to press for a complete definition for
fear that clarity will prove prejudicial to a settlement or to the position
of the party. Thus, we are limited to the cryptic language of section 2,
Ninth for any clues concerning determinations of crafts or classes. There
are two key provisions:
(1) In case of a dispute "among a carrier's employees as to who are
the representatives of such employees designated and authorized in
accordance with the requirements of this Act," the Mediation Board
'Hearings on H.R. 7650 Before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerec, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess., at 45 (1934).
'Railway Labor Act, 49 Stat. 1189, 45 U.S.C. § 181 (1936).
'Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
'Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
'National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1934), as amended, 61 Stat, 151, 29 U.S.C. §
151 (1964).
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is required to investigate and certify the name of the representative of
"the employees involved in the dispute."
(2) The Board is authorized to use any "appropriate method"
which will insure choice by the employees "without interference, influence, or coercion exercised by the carrier," and if an "election" is
held, the Board (or a neutral committee selected by the Board) shall
"designate who may participate in the election."'
The provision requiring designation of "who may participate in the election" is often cited as the statutory basis for the Mediation Board's jurisdiction to determine craft or class. However, literally construed, this provision will apply only if an election is to be held, and plainly the Board is
not required to hold an election. Hence, in my opinion, the really significant language establishing the Board's power is the provision requiring
the Board to resolve employee disputes "as to who are the representatives
of such employees." The exact source of the Board's authority is critical
for, if the Board has only the power to decide who may vote in an election,
its function may be quite limited. But if it may decide any dispute among
employees concerning who is their representative, it has jurisdiction of an
extremely broad range of potential disputes among employees and unions.
While the Board has not been completely consistent in all its actions
throughout its history, it has been reasonably consistent in taking a restrictive view of its powers under section 2, Ninth. For example, in Loco-

motive Engineers v. National Mediation Board,8 the Board is quoted as
saying that its authority under section 2, Ninth does not extend to a
"jurisdictional dispute as such" and therefore, section 2, Ninth would not
apply to a dispute as to whether Engineers' or Firemen's unions may negotiate concerning "apprentice engineers." This view of the Board was supported by at least one court in Railroad Trainmen v. National Mediation
Board,9 at the time when craft or class determinations were thought to be
subject to judicial review. However, in that case Judge Rutledge dissented vigorously, pointing out that a representation dispute "involves not
only the question of who shall be representative, but also who shall be
represented" and the Board must make the decision. As he said, "This
necessarily involves fixing the craft or class lines . . .and when doing this
requires settlement of a jurisdictional dispute, whether over work or men,
the Board must make the decision."'
On the same day that these conflicting views were expressed, the same
court wrote two conflicting opinions on the issue of the size of a craft
or class in Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board.".The majority
opinion, written by Judge (later Chief Justice) Vinson, invoked legislative history and erudite principles of statutory interpretation to uphold
the Mediation Board's decision that a craft or class must be carrier-wide and
"Railway Labor Act, § 2, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 48 Stat. 1168, 45 U.S.C.
(1964).
9
Locomotive Eng'rs Union v. NMB, 284 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1968).
Railroad Trainmen Union v. NMB, 135 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
'ld.
it 783.
"Switchmen's Union v. NMB, 135 F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1943).

§
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therefore, the small union involved in that case was lawfully swallowed
by the big one with the Board's blessing. Judge (later Associate Justice)
Rutledge wrote a dissenting opinion asserting that the National Mediation Board had discretion to designate bargaining units of varying sizes,
giving prominent weight to the over-all purpose of the Railway Labor
Act-the establishment and maintenance of labor peace and stability. All
this learned debate came to naught when the Switchmen's case went to
the Supreme Court, for there it was decided, to the surprise of all concerned, that the Board's discretion was virtually unlimited," being totally
beyond the range of judicial review.
The Switchmen's Union case was part of one of those trilogies which
the Supreme Court loves to set up from time to time-the other two parts
being the M-K-T case" and the Southern Pacific case."' In this "section
2, Ninth Trilogy" the Supreme Court clearly rejected the theory that
the Mediation Board's power to determine craft or class was limited
in character. The Court remarked: "It is apparently the view of the National Mediation Board that § 2, Ninth was designed to cover only those
disputes entailing an election by employees of their representatives.""
However, in the text of the opinion the Court said: "It is clear from the
legislative history of § 2, Ninth that it was designed .. .to resolve a wide

range of jurisdictional disputes between unions and between groups of
employees."'" Immediately after finding that the Board's power extended
to a "wide range of jurisdictional disputes," the Court shut off judicial
review, thus limiting the possibility that the courts might clarify the
precise extent of such power. The Court did reserve the question as to
"[w]hether judicial power may ever be exercised to require the Mediation
Board to exercise the 'duty' imposed upon it under § 2, Ninth and, if so,
the type or types of situation in which it may be invoked ....
.,',
Some of us thought that judicial review might become available again
when the Administrative Procedure Act' was enacted in 1946, but in the
Kirkland case" the court of appeals held that the Railway Labor Act "precludes review" because the Supreme Court so stated in the Switchmen's
Union case, and therefore the Administrative Procedure Act changed
nothing in this respect. Since the "section 2, Ninth Trilogy," most of the
judicial light cast on the subject of craft or class has resulted from reflection and indirection. Much of this reflected light results from the refusal
of the courts to grant relief in various disputes on the ground that craft
or class issues are involved and are the exclusive province of the Mediation
Board.
The first significant craft or class litigation in the airline industry arose
"Switchmen's
"General

Union v. NMB,

320 U.S. 297 (1943).

Comm. of Adjustment v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 320 U.S. 323 (1943).

Comm. of Adjustment v. Southern Pacific Co., 320 U.S. 338 (1943).
"Switchmen's Union v. NMB, 320 U.S. at 336 n.11 (1943).
"Id.
at 336.
7
1 Id. at 336 n.12.
'"General

"Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237, 5 U.S.C. S 1001 (1946).
"Kirkland v. Atlantic Coastline R.R., 167 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 843

(1948).
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out of the Mediation Board's first important determination in the industry
-the series of rulings in 1947, summed up in what is generally referred
to as "NMB Case No. R-1706"-in which the Board established the major
classifications of ground employees of the airlines. One of the immediate
effects of that decision was to divide up the janitors, represented by a small
union at Pennsylvania Central Airlines, and turn them over to the Railway
Clerks and the Machinists. The court of appeals held that no judicial review was available, and thus another small union lost to the bigger
unions." The Court held that a "Constitutional" issue might have conferred authority for review, but found no such issue in a mere determination of craft or class.
Ironically, the Railway Clerks, which thus captured a small group of
clerks from a smaller union, lost its own representative status in another
jurisdictional dispute. Pennsylvania Central Airlines changed its name to
Capital Airlines, and still later merged with United Air Lines. The Capital
clerical personnel were represented by the Railway Clerks; some clerks
at United were represented by the International Association of Machinists;
but most were unrepresented. Railway Cluerks claimed that its contract
with Capital remained effective despite the merger and United contended
that the union's representation rights expired when the Capital clerks
were outnumbered by the United unorganized clerical employees and
that, consequently, the contract also expired. The Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit held 1 that this was a representation dispute to be decided by the Mediation Board, and thus there was no court jurisdiction.
So far as I know, the Mediation Board was never asked, formally or
informally, to rule on this as a representation dispute, and I am reasonably confident that it would not have taken jurisdiction in the absence
of an application under section 1203.2 of its Rules, supported by
authorization cards signed by at least 35 percent of the employees' in the
entire craft or class as it existed in the merged company. Even then, the
Board would have undertaken only to determine the representative of the
merged craft or class and not the legal question concerning whether the
contract with a minority group survived the merger.' This case illustrates
the vast gulf between the courts and the Board concerning the extent of
the Board's power under section 2, Ninth. The courts have said repeatedly
that the Board has jurisdiction over disputes which the Board has considered wholly foreign to section 2, Ninth.'
Undoubtedly the case for the Railway Clerks in the Sixth Circuit was
'0 United Transport Service Employees Union v. NMB, 179 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
" Railway Clerks Union v. United Air Lines, 325 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. dismissed,
379 U.S. 26 (1964).
22 29 C.F.R. §§ 1203.2, 1206.2 (1964).
"aThe Board was asked by Railway Clerks to interpret the meaning and application of the
agreement as a "meditation agreement" pursuant to § 5, Second but it concluded cryptically that
"the language means just what itsays." (Cf. Teamsters Union v. Allegheny Airlines, 58 CCH Lab.
Cas. 12,944 (D.D.C. 1968)).
4
" See Railroad Trainmen Union v. NMB, 135 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Switchmen's Union
v. NMB, 135 F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1943); General Comm. of Adjustment v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas
R.R., 320 U.S. 323 (1943); and Locomotive Eng'rs Union v. NMB, 284 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C.
1968).
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damaged considerably because, while the litigation was pending, the Railway Clerks filed an application with the Mediation Board seeking to represent the entire craft or class of clerical employees at United. Thus, the
dispute over continued effectiveness of a contract with a minority group
was, logically or illogically, fused--or confused-with the larger issue of
representation of the entire group. This application by the Railway Clerks
led to the famous ABNE cases in which the Supreme Court ultimately
took jurisdiction (as foreshadowed in the M-K-T case) to determine
whether the Board had performed its statutory duty with respect to craft
or class, 6 but upheld the Board's refusal to upset the craft or class established under the Board's decision in Case No. R-1706. This Supreme Court
decision is perhaps most notable for its implications rather than its holdings. Among its implications are the following:
(1) The Board might be reversed if it "adhered solely to the craft
or class chosen by the unions," and
(2) while "Whether and to what extent carriers will be permitted
to present their views on craft or class questions is a matter that the
Act leaves solely in the discretion of the Board," the Board's action
might have been seriously questioned by the Court but for the fact
that United "participated in the proceeding establishing the craft or
class in question as a cognizable grouping of employees, and it has
had opportunities since that time to present further evidence.""7
On the latter point, it should be observed that the Court's view is diametrically opposed to the Board's as the Board has consistently claimed
that it has no power to permit a carrier to be a party to a section 2,
Ninth proceeding since the statutory language apparently draws a distinction between the carrier and the "parties" to the dispute, and prohibits the carrier from having any "influence" on the determination.'
I have never been able to understand how such a determination could be
made intelligently without active participation by the carrier (which, of
course, is most familiar with the functions of the various groups of employees and other factors which are essential to any craft or class determination), and the Board evidently recognizes that the carrier is essential
since it regularly permits participation by the carrier in its section 2,
Ninth craft or class proceedings, although ostensibly for the sole purpose
of furnishing necessary information as desired by the Board.2
Somewhat reluctantly, but inevitably, I turn now to the long, bitter
25Railway Clerks v. Employees Ass'n, 380 U.S. 650 (1965).
"In Air Line Dispatchers Union v. NMB, 189 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
849 (1951) the court reviewed a determination by the Mediation Board (invoking footnote 12 of
the M-K-T decision) but upheld the Board's decision that a group of employees wholly outside
the continental United States is not subject to the Railway Labor Act. The first court decision
directly ordering the Board to make a craft or class determination where it had declined to do so
is Locomotive Eng'rs Union v. NMB, 284 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1968).
27 Outside the scope of this study is the Supreme Court's "implication" that a failure to vote
in a representation proceeding constitutes a "no union" vote, contrary to the finding in Virginian
Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937). But see Aeronautical Radio v. Mediation
Board, 380 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
28 See
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and incredibly costly pilot-flight engineer dispute which, out of a welter
of confusion, may have produced some guidelines to the future of craft
or class determinations. A brief historical background may be necessary
to understand the significance of this dispute in relation to the craft or
class issue. In the mid-1950's, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA)
adopted a "policy" that all active crew members in the cockpit must be
pilot-qualified, but it indicated a willingness to consider some form of job
security for the then incumbents of non-pilot cockpit positions. Flight
Engineers' International Association (FEIA) immediately recognized this
policy as a threat to its existence as a union and it persuaded the non-pilot
flight engineers that their jobs were also at stake. FEIA's response to the
ALPA "policy" was a renewed and strengthened demand that all crewmen
acting as flight engineers be licensed as airframe and powerplant (A and P)
mechanics-a qualification which few pilots would be likely to obtain.
The FEIA theory was that ALPA could never take over its jobs, its representation rights or its union so long as it had a contractual job qualification
which pilots could or would not meet. With battle lines thus drawn, a
direct conflict was inevitable. It occurred at Eastern Air Lines in 1957-58.
After lengthy emergency board proceedings, Eastern agreed-as recommended by the emergency board headed by David Cole-to give flight
engineers training as pilots and to require that on the new jet aircraft all
flight engineers must have pilot qualifications. ALPA agreed, although this
agreement was somewhat less than its announced "policy," and it would
keep pilots from taking over the flight engineers' jobs. But FEIA rejected
the proposal, contending that any acceptance of pilot training would lead
eventually to the loss of flight engineer jobs and bargaining autonomy.
When Eastern hesitated in its program to force free pilot training on the
flight engineers, ALPA set a strike date. Eastern obtained a temporary
restraining order on the theory that ALPA was seeking unlawfully to
bargain with Eastern concerning the job qualifications of another craft
or class. As can be imagined, this was a theory which was invoked and
quoted often by FEIA in the subsequent years of controversy among
Eastern, ALPA and FEIA.
The basic argument was commonly referred to as a "jurisdictional dispute" between pilot and flight engineer unions. The unions both rejected
that characterization, saying that the question was simply "what qualifications does the job require?"-not "what union represents the incumbents?" or "what classification of employees is entitled to perform the work
of flight engineer?" Nevertheless, it was a "jurisdictional dispute" and a
representation dispute involving the question of craft or class, as the courts
finally and definitively adjudicated.
Eastern's 38-day flight engineer strike in 1958 over this jurisdictional
dispute (and the parallel dispute at each of American, Pan American and
TWA) was settled by an agreement between the carrier and FEIA that
flight engineers need not accept free pilot training, and an agreement between the carrier and ALPA that on jet aircraft there would be a third
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qualified pilot, thus creating a four-man crew and a "fifth wheel." I hasten
to say that the "fifth wheel" was neither the flight engineer nor the third
pilot; rather it was a combination of the two, for job functions were redistributed, and all crew members on Eastern, at least, had something essential
to do. The airline simply did not need four men to do that work. The
presence of the fourth man in the cockpit created more problems than
it was expected to solve. Immediately there was an argument over the
carriers' duties to train the third pilot. ALPA thought that the airlines
were committed to qualify the third pilot as a flight engineer, and the
airlines thought that the training commitment was much less extensive.
At Eastern, ALPA sought to enforce its interpretation by refusing to take
training on new aircraft until the issue was settled. Eastern obtained injunctive relief on the ground that interpretation of the agreement was the
exclusive province of the system board of adjustment,'0 relying on the
Chicago River case." The issue eventually was settled by arbitration.
At TWA, the same issue was "settled" initially by arbitration between
ALPA and the carrier, but FEIA sought an injunction against enforcement of the award which required TWA to train pilots as flight engineers. The resulting court decision"2 is one of the most significant since the
Supreme Court's "section 2, Ninth Trilogy" of 1943. The court denied
the injunctive relief sought by FEIA holding that the underlying dispute
was "jurisdictional" and fundamentally the same as the dispute in the
M-K-T case. In comparing the TWA case with the M-K-T case the court
said: "In both cases the argument advanced by plaintiff is that the contract is invalid because the carrier dealt with the wrong employee representative .... ." The court then applied to the TWA case the following
quotation from the M-K-T case:
It involves a jurisdictional dispute-an asserted overlapping of the interests
of two crafts. It necessitates a determination of the point where the authority
of one craft ends and the other begins or of the zones where they have joint
authority.'

This sounds like simplicity itself, and M-K-T appears to "fit like a glove."
But until the TWA decision, I doubt that many lawyers had considered
the possibility that the pilot-flight engineer dispute was that kind of "jurisdictional dispute," that is, one which the Mediation Board could even
possibly be expected to settle.
As you may recall, in 1960, Eastern also had what might be termed a
"class or craft dispute" between the pilots and the FAA inspectors over
whether the third pilot or the inspector was entitled to sit in the third
pilot's seat.' Possibly that dispute should have been referred to and decided
by the Mediation Board under section 2, Ninth. However, the injunction
which Eastern obtained, and which was miserably ineffective, was based
s0 Eastern Air Lines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, No. 9702-M (S.D. Fla. 1960).
3'Chicago River & I.R.R. v. Trainmen Union, 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
"Flight Eng'rs Union v. Trans World Airlines, 205 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
3320 U.S. at 334-35.
4
3 1d. at 334.
"'Eastern Air Lines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, No. 10,026-M (S.D. Fla. 1960).
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on the theory that the principal "dispute" was between ALPA and the
government and, therefore, not a "labor dispute" over which ALPA could
lawfully strike," and to the extent any "labor dispute" existed it was
subject to adjustment board jurisdiction."
FEIA's fears that ALPA's insistence on pilot training for flight engineers would lead to loss of the union's rights as representatives bore fruit
in early 1961 when a committee (the Donaldson Committee) appointed
by the Mediation Board decided that because United had trained all crew
members in both flight and mechanical functions and crew members at
United were "integrated," the flight engineer "functions can no longer
be considered separate from those of other members of the flight crew."'"
Thus the pilots and flight engineers were merged into a single class or
craft at United. 9
A massive protest strike by flight engineers, clearly a strike against the
government (the Mediation Board and its committee), grounded seven
airlines in February, 1961, and the flight engineers returned to work only
after President Kennedy appointed the Feinsinger Commission to attempt
settlement of the basic pilot-flight engineer dispute. Several of the airlines
obtained injunctions against the strike, principally on the theory that it
was started prior to exhaustion of the procedures of the Railway Labor Act
and was based on a dispute with the government rather than with the individual airlines. So far as I know, no one suggested that this was a jurisdictional dispute which could or should be settled by the Mediation Board
by a class or craft determination under section 2, Ninth. The terms recommended by the Feinsinger Commission for a settlement called for even
more pilot training for flight engineers on jets than the Cole emergency
board recommended in the Eastern case in 1958, but some attempt was
made to provide representational and job security for FEIA and its members. The airlines accepted the Feinsinger recommendations, and FEIA
likewise purported to do so. ALPA never responded, although it later
entered into some agreements which were similar to the Feinsinger recommendations. FEIA signed a Feinsinger-type agreement at TWA, yet refused to sign such agreements at Pan American and Eastern, and called a
strike against both carriers for 23 June 1962. Pan American obtained a
temporary restraining order which remained in effect far longer than was
lawful under Rule 65 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,' but
" Cf. Railroad Trainmen Union v. New York Cent. R.R., 246 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1957).
" Slocum v. Delaware L. & W. R.R., 339 U.S. 239 (1950).
38 3 DETERMINATION OF CRAFT OR CLASS OF THE NATIONAL

MEDIATION BOARD, JULY

1, 1953 -

30, 1961, at 56, 72, U.S. Gov't Printing Office (1961). This Mediation Board decision was
allowed to stand in UNA Chapter, FEIA v. NMB, 294 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 956 (1962), where the court said: "It has become well settled that in making 'craft or
class' determinations, the National Mediation Board may regroup, amalgamate, or splinter 'historic'
bargaining groups, taking into account technological and functional changes, and that the decision
of the Board in setting up a 'class' for representation in a jurisdictional dispute is unreviewable in
the courts."
" Both the Mediation Board and other high government officials gave public assurances that the
class or craft decision at United was based on the peculiar factual situation, and would not constitute a precedent elsewhere. Nevertheless, FEIA and its members regarded the decision as a severe threat to their security.
4
oPan American World Airways v. Flight Eng'rs Union, 306 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1962).
JUNE
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barely long enough to permit settlement of the dispute without a strike.
At Eastern, the strike began on 23 June. After a month of complete
shutdown, Eastern started to replace striking flight engineers with pilots
trained by the company as flight engineers and equipped with flight engineer licenses, but without the A and P mechanics' licenses required by
the FEIA contract with Eastern. Naturally, litigation ensued. For present
purposes, the New York City federal court litigation is most significant.
Two suits were filed by FEIA alleging bad-faith bargaining, unfair labor
practices and unlawful bargaining between Eastern and ALPA concerning
flight engineer qualifications, duties and pay. In the district court injunctive
relief was denied in both cases on the merits,4' although in both cases Eastern raised as a defense the claim that a "jurisdictional dispute" was involved, and therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction. The first decision was
affirmed per curiam on the merits." The second decision was affirmed on
the ground that the underlying dispute involved the problems of representation and jurisdiction between the labor unions, and, therefore, the
court lacked jurisdiction for the reasons stated in the M-K-T case.
In 1964 the National Mediation Board certified ALPA as the bargaining
representative of Eastern's flight engineers after an election in which both
the strikers and their replacements were allowed to vote." FEIA subsequently amended its complaint in the second New York lawsuit to seek
damages and mandatory relief reinstating the strikers. On motion for
summary judgment, the district court dismissed the action on the ground
that the basic dispute was still a representation matter.4 The court of
appeals affirmed," holding that a court order reinstating the strikers would
fly "in the teeth of the board's certification" of ALPA as the representative
of Eastern's flight engineers, and that the requested award of damages
would have a similar effect since employers could not rely on Mediation
Board certifications if they were subject to severe damages for so doing.
This long story throws a great deal of light on the "craft or class" power
of the Mediation Board and the "wide range of jurisdictional disputes"'"
which the Board is charged with deciding. Not only may the Board decide
whether and to what extent a carrier may bargain with one union with respect to training to be given the members of another," but it may also decide the precise line of demarcation between the bargaining jurisdiction of
two unions with respect to rates of pay, rules and working conditions," or,
41Flight Eng'rs Union v. Eastern Air Lines, 208 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Flight Eng'rs
Union v. Eastern Air Lines, 45 CCH Lab. Cas. 17,814 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
"SFlight Eng'rs Union v. Eastern Air Lines, 307 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 945 (1963).
"Flight Eng'rs Union v. Eastern Air Lines, 311 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373
U.S. 924 (1963).
4 See Flight Eng'rs Union v. NMB, 338 F.2d 280 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
'5 Flight Eng'rs Union v. Eastern Air Lines, 243 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
46
Flight Eng'rs Union v. Eastern Air Lines, 359 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
47
See General Comm. of Adjustment v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 320 U.S. 323 n.11 (1943).
'a See Flight Eng'rs Union v. Trans World Airlines, 205 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
49See Flight Eng'rs Union v. Eastern Air Lines, 208 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Id. at 307
F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 945 (1963); Flight Eng'rs Union v. Eastern Air
Lines, 45 CCH Lab. Cas. 17,814 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Id. at 311 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. de-
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as the Court said in M-K-T, "the point where the authority of one craft
ends and the other begins or of the zones where they have joint authority.""0
But most significantly, if this type of jurisdictional dispute underlies a
broader dispute, there is no orderly method for settling any of the questions
presented unless the Board decides the jurisdictional dispute.
It could be argued that the absence of a judicial remedy does not compel
the conclusion that there is an administrative remedy. The Supreme Court
implied in the M-K-T case that some disputes may be beyond the jurisdiction of either judicial or administrative tribunals. However, it seems clear
that the present trend of the Supreme Court is to require administrative
settlement of jurisdictional disputes under the Railway Labor Act,"5 and
I would anticipate that the courts would extend that tendency and would
hold that the Mediation Board must decide the type of question presented
in the TWA and Eastern cases.

One may wonder how the Board would proceed to settle such a dispute.
Certainly it would have to develop techniques different from those customarily used by the Board in the past, for an election or a card check will
not determine what training or qualifications are needed for a particular
job or how the jurisdictional lines between two unions are to be drawn.
However, it seems that the fundamental difficulties involved in the settlement of such a dispute are not much greater than those entailed in a decision by an adjustment board as to which of two unions has jurisdiction
over a particular job function, and the Supreme Court has made it quite
clear that the adjustment board must make this type of decision."2 Quite
possibly, the Board would use the committee technique to decide such
questions, just as it created the Donaldson Committee to decide the United
craft or class issue. In any event, it seems that if, as the courts have said,
the TWA and Eastern disputes are basically questions of representation,
it is the Board's duty to resolve those disputes under section 2, Ninth and
I think the courts should direct the Board to perform that duty." That
is what some courts have tried to do in the similar "apprentice engineer" cases."4 Recently, the railroads have faced a shortage of engineers
because of the declining number of firemen eligible for promotion. To
meet this shortage, the railroads have created a classification of "apprentice
engineers" and have contracted with the Locomotive Engineers with respect to terms and conditions of employment. The Firemen's union has also
claimed jurisdiction of the new classification. The Mediation Boardamong other puzzling and seemingly inconsistent actions-denied mediation on the ground that a "question of representation" was presented by
nied, 373 U.S. 924 (1963); Id. at 243 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 359 F.2d 303 (2d
Cir. 1966); Flight Eng'rs Union v. NMB, 338 F.2d 280 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
'0320

U.S. at 334-35.

"1Transportation-Communication Employees Union v. Union Pacific R.R., 385 U.S. 157 (1966).
52 Id.
" See Air Line Dispatchers Union v. NMB, 189 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
849 (1951); Locomotive Eng'rs Union v. NMB, 284 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1968); supra note
26, and related text.
"'Locomotive Eng'rs Union v. NMB, 284 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1968); cf. Locomotive Firemen Union v. Louisville & N. R.R., 400 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 59 CCH Lab.
Cas. 13,204 (1969).
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the dispute between the Engineers and the Firemen, and then refused to
proceed under section 2, Ninth on the ground that it was "not a representation dispute" but involved only "an issue as to the right of employees
of one craft or class to do the work that is alleged to be that commonly
done by employees of another craft or class." In Locomotive Firemen v.
Louisville & N.R.R.," the court rejected a request by the Firemen for an
injunction against the apprentice program, stating that the dispute was
subject to the Mediation Board's jurisdiction under section 2, Ninth. In
0
the district court
Locomotive Engineers v. National Mediation Board,"
specifically held that the Board had a duty to settle the dispute under
section 2, Ninth and ordered the Board to perform that duty. This seems
to me to be clearly correct although the court of appeals reversed.
I always dislike performing postmortems on cases which I have handled.
It is much more interesting to dissect another lawyer's cadaver. I am compelled, however, to wonder whether injunctions could have been obtained
against the flight engineer and pilot strikes of the past ten years on the
theory (1) that the basic dispute was a jurisdictional one between pilots and
flight engineers which was subject to the exclusive power of the Mediation
Board; (2) that the Board had a duty to resolve that dispute; (3) that until
the administrative remedy had been exhausted the parties to the dispute
could not use "self-help";' and (4) that after the dispute had been settled
by the Board the parties could not strike over the outcome." I doubt if the
courts at that time were ready for such an extension of the M-K-T and
Chicago River doctrines. While the courts were glad to seize upon the
phrase "jurisdictional dispute" or "representation dispute" to avoid judicial
intervention in a messy situation, I suspect that the judicial attitude toward section 2, Ninth was not then ripe for such a revolutionary step.
It may well be ripe now.
While speculating and philosophizing, we may consider a few collateral
issues which will arise if the courts compel the Mediation Board to decide
such jurisdictional issues. Perhaps the most difficult question is: Which
issues are subject to section 2, Ninth, and which are subject to the jurisdiction of the adjustment board? How does one distinguish between the
question of who is entitled to bargain and the question of the legal effect
where two unions have contracted for the same work? Just to illustrate
the difficulty, the Supreme Court in the Transportation-Communication
Employees Union case " held that adjustment board must decide which of
two unions claiming they had contracted with the carrier for the same
work was actually entitled to the work. Yet, is that not exactly the same
issue which was involved in the M-K-T case? Possibly a distinction can
be drawn between jurisdiction to bargain and jurisdiction of work resulting from two bargains by two unions, but I foresee a long future of litiga" Locomotive Firemen Union v. Louisville & N. R.R., 400 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1968).
"Locomotive Eng'rs Union v. NMB, 284 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1968), rev'd, 59 CCH Lab.
Cas. 7 13,361 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
" See Chicago River & I. R.R. v. Trainmen Union, 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
"aLocomotive Eng'rs v. Louisville & N. R.R., 373 U.S. 33 (1963).
" Transportation-Communication Employees Union v. Union Pacific R.R., 385 U.S. 157 (1966).
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tion on this issue which may well rival or exceed the controversy over
the dichotomy between "major" and "minor" disputes. 0
Another troublesome question may relate to exhaustion of administrative remedies. Since the Mediation Board takes the position that the carrier
is not a party to section 2, Ninth proceedings and has no right to initiate
such proceedings, I suppose the carrier always will be free to seek judicial
relief whenever a representation dispute threatens its operations. However,
I think the recent developments in the law which I have just outlined may
well lead to a re-evaluation of this ancient and outmoded position of the
Mediation Board. In any event, I assume that before one union could seek
judicial relief against a bargaining raid by another, it would be required
to submit the dispute to the Mediation Board, just as the carrier must
submit a "minor" dispute to the adjustment board before seeking injunctive relief against a strike."'
Finally, I should like to speculate briefly on the application of the
principles we have just discussed to a situation such as that presented in
Ruby v. American Airlines," where it was held that American violated
the Railway Labor Act by insisting on negotiating with a joint pilotflight engineer committee to resolve issues affecting both pilots and flight
engineers. The committee was created by voluntary agreement of the parties, and negotiations were conducted under the auspices of the National
Mediation Board with its chairman attending many of the meetings. When
the flight engineers became disenchanted with the committee, the pilot
representatives continued to claim that the committee represented both
groups, and American insisted on a continuance of the joint negotiations
to resolve the joint and overlapping problems. The majority of the court
of appeals held that this was an unlawful refusal to bargain with FEIA.
Judge Friendly dissented, stating that the real issue was "whether the
Railway Labor Act prohibits an employer who faces the demands of two
employee groups that call for a joint solution from insisting that the negotiations be held simultaneously in one room and across one table, and requires him instead to negotiate across two tables in two separate rooms,
running back and forth from one to the other."'"
The Ruby situation would seem to be an excellent example of a dispute
among employees "as to who are the representatives of such employees."
As the Supreme Court noted in the M-K-T case, it is the Board's duty to
resolve such a dispute, to determine not only the dividing line between
the authority of each group of employees, but also "the zones where they
60 See the majority and dissenting opinions in Seafarers Union v. Board of Trustees of Galveston

Wharves, 351 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1965). A similar controversy may arise over whether the issue
is appropriate for negotiation and mediation on the one hand, or for determination under section 2,
Ninth on the other-that is, whether a section 6 demand reaches into an area where the carrier
cannot settle because another union "is the true adversary." Southern Pac. Co. v. Switchmen's
Union, 356 F.2d 332, 335 (9th Cir. 1965).
6
Manion v. Kansas City Terminal, 353 U.S. 927 (1957). It should be observed that when a
representation dispute is pending before the Mediation Board the carrier cannot be required to deal
with any disputant until the dispute has been settled. Pan American World Airways v. Teamsters
Union, 275 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 404 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1969).
"Ruby v. American Airlines, 329 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1964),

"Id. at 23-24.
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have joint authority." Pilots and flight engineers have both joint and
several interests where the bargaining contemplates the possibility of crossbidding from flight engineer to pilot and from pilot to flight engineer,
just as is true with the railroad engineers and firemen who frequently move
from one classification to the other. Certainly, in this type of situation,
joint bargaining and joint solutions should be encouraged. With the
Mediation Board as both mediator and judge as to the extent to which joint
rights and joint authority are present, problems of this type can be solved
in a realistic manner. In any event, it seems to me that once a joint bargaining committee has been established by agreement of the parties, any
dispute among them as to the authority of the committee is necessarily one
for the Mediation Board, not for the courts.
In summary, I believe that the recent decisions of the courts in declining to grant judicial relief in the presence of "representation disputes"
have, by indirection, created the possibility that the Mediation Board will
greatly expand its functions to decide the myriad jurisdictional disputes
which arise between bargaining representatives over the right to bargain
with respect to work and employees. Far from being the mere election
judge, as the Board has considered itself for years, it should step up to the
"wide range of jurisdictional disputes" which the Supreme Court long
ago said section 2, Ninth was designed to solve. If the Board does not
voluntarily undertake the resolution of such disputes, I believe the courts
should direct such action, as was done by the district court in the case of
the "apprentice engineers." Jurisdictional disputes should no longer be a
mere justification for judicial abstention; they should be a reason for administrative action to resolve them, thus giving effect to the most significant purpose of the Railway Labor Act: "The prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules or working conditions.""

64 Railway Labor Act § 2, 44 Stat. 577 (1926),
(1964).

as amended, 48 Stat. 1168, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (a)

